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ABSTRACT
We showthat,when plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty.
neither the American rule of litigation cost allocation (under which each litigant bears its own
expenses) nor the British rule (under which the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the
winning litigant) would induce plaintiffs to make optimal decisions to bring suit. In particular,
plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs are sufficiently small relative to the
amount at stake, and plaintiffs may not bring some meritorious suits when litigation costs are
sufficiently large relative to the amount at stake.
We analyze the effect of more general fee-shifting rules that are based not only upon the
identity of the winning party but also on how strong the court peiceives the case to be at the end
of the trial —thatis, the "margin of victory." In particular, we explore how and when one can
design such a rule to induce plaintiffs to sue if and only if they believe their cases are sufficiently
strong. Our analysis suggests some considerations to guide the interpretation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure II.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under fee-shifting rules a court can require the losing litigant to pay the attorneys' fees
of the winning litigant. Although there exists a substantial literature on the economic analysis
of such fee-shifting rules, the assumption throughout has been that fee-shifting will depend only
upon the identity of the winning party. This paper contributes to that literature by considering
the effect of fee-shifting rules that are based not only on which party won the case but also on
how strong the court perceives the plaintiff's case to be at the end of the trial —thatis, the
"margin of victory." In particular, we analyze how expanding the set of instruments available
to courts can provide better incentives for a plaintiff to bring suit. This analysis reveals how
and when one can design such a rule to induce plaintiffs to sue only if they believe their cases
are sufficiently strong.
This analysis of fee-shifting rules based on the margin of victory is not only of theoretical
interest but also of practical significance: as we will discuss in Section VI, courts have
interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Ii as an example of such a nile. In order to deter
parties from filing frivolous papers in court, Rule II authorizes courts to impose sanctions upon
those who file such papers. Typically, a court uses Rule Ii against the plaintiff, when it
determines that the plaintiff's claims are so lacking in merit that they are frivolous, and the
sanction that courts have imposed most frequently is an order that the plaintiff pay the
defendant's attorney's fees. Our analysis will produce conclusions that shed light on the role
that Rule II can play in improving the plaintiffs incentives to bring suit.
Suppose that society seeks to induce plaintiffs to sue if and only if they believe they are
entitled to prevail at trial. (As discussed in Section VII. the analysis of this paper is more
general, that is, also allows for other objectives.) This objective implies two goals: that a
plaintiff bring a "meritorious" suit --whichwe define as a suit that deserves to win on the
merits, as the plaintiff views the case —andthat a plaintiff not bring a "frivolous" suit --which
we define as a suit that does not deserve to win on the merits, as the plaintiff views the case.
How can fee-shifting rules best serve these goals?'
'In recent papers, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1992; 1993) examine how awards and sanctions
can discourage frivolous suits and encourage meritorious suits. They do not, however, consider2
One important consideration is the fact that the outcome of a trial is unlikely to be certain
to the plaintiff when it decides whether to sue. One source of uncertainty is that the court might
lack information available to the plaintiff or can err in its judgment given the information that
it can observe. Furthermore, the plaintiff might lack information that a trial would later reveal
tothe court. As a result, the plaintiff might attach some probability to winning even if it views
its case as weak, and it might attach some probability to losing even if it views its case as
strong.2
Consider first the standard American rule, under which each litigant bears its own
expenses. This rule does not induce optimal litigation decisions. First, plaintiffs will not bring
all meritorious suits. Even if the plaintiff can count on the court to decide the case as the
plaintiff predicts, the plaintiff will not sue if its litigation costs exceed the amount that it expects
to recover. Second, if the plaintiff believes that the court's decision might differ from what the
plaintiff expects, either because the court might err or because the plaintiff might err, then as
we will show, the plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits. If the litigation costs are small
enough, the plaintiff will fmd it worthwhile to gamble —eitherbecause the court might err in
the plaintiff's favor or because the case might prove to be better than it firstappears.
Consider next the British rule, under which the loser pays the expenses of the winner.
If the plaintiff could predict the trial outcome without error, then the plaintiff would not bring
a frivolous suit and would never be discouraged by litigation expenses from bringing a
meritorious suit, which would guarantee the plaintiff reimbursement of its litigationexpenses.
If the plaintiff cannot predict the trial outcome with certainty, however, then as we will show,
the plaintiff will not always make litigation decisions consistent with the goals suggested above.
the subject that is the main focus of this paper: how fee-shifting based on themargin of victory
can advance these goals. Whereas we focus on the criteria courts might use in deciding whether
or not to shift fees, Polinsky and Rubinfeld focus on the magnitudes of awards and sanctions as
policy instruments.
2Polinsky and Shavell (1989) stressed the important effect of legal uncertainty causedby
judicial error upon the incentive to sue. They do not study, however, how fee-shifting based
on the margin of victozy can address the problem of judicial error (and other reasons for the
unpredictability of judgment).3
First, if litigation costs are small enough, then the plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits
because it might win at trial anyway. Second, if litigation costs are sufficiently large, then the
prospect of losing (and bearing the expenses of both litigants) will deter the plaintiff from
bringing some meritorious suits because it still might lose at thai.
This paper shows how to design fee-shifting rules so as to induce better litigation
decisions. The fee-shifting should depend not only on which party prevails but also on the
margin by which they prevailed. That is, the rule should take into account not only who won
but also the degree to which they won easily. This information is useful because a plaintiff who
loses by a large margin is less likely to have believed cx ante that the case was meritorious than
a plaintiff who loses by a small margin. Similarly, a plaintiff who wins by a large margin is
less likely to have believed cx ante that the case was frivolous than a plaintiff who wins by a
small margin.
Given the distribution of the errors in the plaintiff's prediction of the trial outcome, it is
possible to design a fee-shifting rule that would induce better litigation decisions. Because the
optimal rule depends on this distribution, a court can implement such a rule as long as it has
some sense of how these errors are distributed. This paper examines the structure of such rules
and how they affect litigation decisions then applies our conclusions to Rule 11 as it exists
today.
Section II of this paper presents the formal model of litigation that we shall use to analyze
the plaintiffs incentives to bring suit. Section iii examines those incentives under the classic
fee-shifting rules, which allocate litigation costs according to the identity of the losing party.
In Section IV, we allow the fee-shifting rule to depend upon the margin of victory as well, and
we show how one can thereby provide the plaintiff with better incentives to bring suit. Section
V shows that if the court can shift the fees of either litigant in each case, then there exists a
whole family of such fee-shifting rules that can present plaintiffs with these improved incentives.
Section VI considers the implications of our analysis for the application of Rule 11. Section Vii
explores some extensions of our model.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Consider a potential plaintiff that is deciding whether to bring suit against a potential4
defendant. Let x be the parameter relevant for determining the merits of the plaintiff's suit (or
an index that summarizes all the relevant parameters). Without loss of generality, we can define
x such that the plaintiff's case is stronger, and the defendant's case is correspondingly weaker,
as x increases. In particular, let I represent the threshold value for a victory for the plaintiff:
the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff if and only if the court finds that x exceeds I.
This framework is general enough to describe the situation under a wide variety of rules
setting forth the standard of liability. For example, the defendant's liability in a particular tort
suit might depend on whether the plaintiff was conuibutoriiy negligent, in which case x would
represent the amount by which the plaintiff's level of care exceeded the standard for negligence,
and I wouldequal0.Or the casemight turn onwhetherthe defendant was negligent, in which
casexwould representthe amount bywhichthe defendant's actual level of care fell short of the
standard of due care (that is, the extent of the defendant's underinvestrnent insafety
precautions), and I wouldequal0. Or the case might turn on an issue of causation, and x might
be a feature that determines whether the court will find proximate cause.
Let ; denote the value of x observed by the court and thus the value of xupon which
the court bases its judgment. An important feature of our model is that thecourt may not be
able to identi' x accurately. Specifically, except in Section '.A, we assume that thecourt errs
by a random amount e, so that ; =x+e.The random variable e is distributed according to
a cumulative distribution function F(e). For any particular realization of e, e', thecorresponding
F(e') will equal the probability cx ante that e￿e'. Let ttakeon positive and negative values,
each with some positive probability, so that 0 CF(O)<1.For simplicity, assume that e only
takes on values within the inten'al (-e1, e,J, where bothe1 and ; are positive, and let F(e) be
continuous and strictly increasing over this interval.
Let çdenotethe probability that 8>0, that is, the likelihood that the court wilterr in
favor of the plaintiff, so that 0,= l-F(0).Accordingly, 0, is the likelihood that a defendant who
just barely deserves to win on the merits (that is, a defendant in the marginalcase in which
x=I) will nevertheless lose because the court errs in favor of the plaintiff. Let0ddenotethe
probability that e￿0, that is, the likelihood that the court will not err in favor of theplaintiff,
so that °d= F(0).Accordingly, 0disthe likelihood that the defendant in the marginal case (in
which x=k) will win.5
Thecase in which 04$p½willprove to be a useful example. l'his case is symmetric
insofar as the court is as likely to decide the marginal case in favor of the defendant as it is in
favor of the plaintiff: the court is as likely to overestimate the strength of the plaintiff's case
as it is to underestimate it. Our framework is not limited to the symmetric case, however, and
covers also those cases in which the court systematically errs in favor of one side.
Let D denote the amount at stake —thatis. the amount that the court will require the
defendant to pay the plaintiff if the court finds the defendant liable, where D >0. (For example.
in a tort case, D is the amount of damages that the court would award to the plaintiff if the
defendant is found liable.) Let C and C4 be the litigation costs of the plaintiff and of the
defendant, respectively, where C >0 and C4 >0.
Let x be the plaintiff's observation of x when deciding whether or not to bring suit. At
this stage, we assume that the plaintiff knows the true value of x; that is, ,c?=X. Therefore, ;
=x,+e.Section VLA explains how the analysis can be extended easily to the case in which
the plaintiff is imperfectly informed about x. In particular, the court may have information
available at trial that is unavailable to the plaintiff.
Suppose that the social objective is to induce the plaintiff to sue if and only if x > f,
where x' is some threshold. This general statement of the objective is reasonable: we cannot
have the plaintiff act on anything but its impression of its case, and presumably if we want to
deter suits for a certain value of x, we also want to deter suits for any lower values. At this
stage, we assume that f=x.Thatis, the plaintiff should sue if and only if the plaintiff believes
that the defendant is liable. Section VI.B shows how the analysis can be adjusted for the case
in which x does not equal g,
The court observes ; before reaching judgment and also knows D, F(s), Ci,,andC4
when it applies the fee-shifting rule. When the plaintiff decides whether to sue, it knows x,. D,
F(s), C, C4. and the fee-shifting rule.3 The plaintiff is risk neutral and sues if and only if the
3For simplicity, we assume that the plaintiff knows the amount that a court will award, D,
with certainty. In reality, plaintiffs face uncertainty over D as well as over x. The model can
be extended to the case of uncertainty if we let D represent the expected award conditional on
a finding of liability.If this D is independent of ;,thenmuch of our analysis will be
unchanged. If D is a function of x, then the D(xJ function is another policy instrument, which6
expected value of bringing the suitandgoing to trial is positive. Thus, to get optimal decisions
to bring suit, the expected value of going to trial must be non-positive for anyx, ￿ £ and positive
for any x,>X.
Ill. FEE-SHIFTING RULES BASED ON THE WINNER'S IDENTITY
The four classic fee-shifting rules, as described in Shave!! (1982), are charactethedby
the fact that fee-shifting, to the extent that it occurs, depends only on the identity of thewinning
party —thatis, on how ; compares with 1. In addition to the "two-sided' fee-shifting rules
described above, the American rule and the British rule, Shavell discusses two "one-sided'fee-
shifting rules: (I) under the pro-plaintiff rule, each litigant pays its own costs if theplaintiff
loses, but the defendant pays the plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff wins, and (2) under thepro-
defendant rule, each litigant pays its own costs if the defendant loses, but theplaintiff pays the
defendant's costs if the defendant wins. We shall examine the effects of each rulein turn under
two alternative assumptions regarding the plaintiff's ability to predict theoutcome of a trial.
This analysis will lay the foundation for our evaluation of theperformance of fee-shifting rules
that can depend on the margin of victory, because each of the classicfee-shifting rules provides
an important benchmark for comparison.
A. Jud2ment Predicted With Certainty
In this section we assume that;=x,, so that the plaintiff can predict the judgment with
certainty. That is, e is not a random variable; instead, e=O in each case. Consider the effect
of each fee-shifting nile upon the incentives of the plaintiff tobring suit.
1. The American Rule
When the plaintiff can predict the court's judgment withcertainty, the American rule
would discourage all frivolous suits, butmay fail to encourage all meritorious suits.
Specifically, under the American rule, the plaintiff will sue if and only if bothx,> £ and C CD.
Aplaintiff will never bring a frivolous suit, because a case withx,￿ would be bound to lose.
Thus, the plaintiff would recover nothing and would be saddled with at leastits own litigation
we consider as an extension of our model in Section VI1.C.7
costs. A plaintiff might fail to bring a meritorious suit, however, if its litigation costs are
sufficiently large. Even a winning suit,withx,> I, would not be worthwhile if C,> D, because
the plaintiff would not recover enough to pay its litigation costs.
2. The British Rule
When the plaintiff can predict the court's judgment with certainty, the British nile would
discourage all frivolous suits and encourage all meritorious suits. Specifically, under the British
rule, the plaintiff will sue if and only if xi,> i. Without uncertainty over the trial outcome, this
nile yields the optimal incentives for the plaintiff. A plaintiff will never bring a frivolous suit,
because it would be bound to lose. Thus, the plaintiff would recover no damages and bear at
least its own litigation costs. A plaintiff will always bring a meritorious suit, because it would
be bound to win, and in this case the plaintiff would not have to bear its own litigation costs.
3. The Pro-Defendant Rule
Like the American rule, the pro-defendant nile would discourage all frivolous suits, but
may fail to encourage all meritorious suits: under conditions of certainty, the plaintiff will sue
if and only if both and C,, CD. The pro-defendant nile is no improvement over the
American rule. The pro-defendant rule can penalize plaintiffs that bring losing suits, but under
conditions of certainty, plaintiffs will not bring such suits under the American rule anyway.
4. The Pro-Plaintiff Rule
Like the British rule, the pro-plaintiff rule would both discourage all frivolous suits and
encourage all meritorious suits: under conditions of certainty, the plaintiff will sue if and only
if x,,> L The pm-plaintiff rule is an improvement over the American rule. The problem under
the American rule is a failure to encourage all meritorious suits, and the pro-plaintiff nile
addresses this problem by relieving the winning plaintiff of its litigation costs.
B. Judgment Predicted with Uncertainty
In this section we assume that ; =x,+e.where e is a random variable. Thus, the
plaintiff cannot predict the trial outcome with certainty. As we shall see, none of the classic
rules can guarantee that the plaintiff will have optimal incentives in all cases. Under each rule,
plaintiffs bring some frivolous suits and fail to bring some meritorious suits.8
1. The American Rule
Under the American rule, the plaintiff will sue if and only if:
+Pr%>tk,)D>0. (1)
Substituting x,+e for; in (1), we find this condition is equivalent to:
Pr(e>i-x,) >C/B. (2)
Thus, if C,￿D, then (2) cannot bold, and the plaintiff will never sue. If <B, however, the
plaintiff will sue if and only i x,, is greater than some threshold value, which we shall denote
as C. This C is defined by:
1 -F(X-C)=C,/D,
or equivalently:
C.= - F4(1-(C/I))], (3)
whereF', the inverse function of F(e), is defined over the domain (0, 1).
The plaintiff will have optimal incentives if and only if it is just indifferent aboutbringing
the marginal suit (in which xT,=X), that is, if s'=i. Thus, (3) implies that the American rule
will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only if 1-F(0) =C/D.For example, if
F(O)=then the critical value for C/D isRecall that I-F(0) equals O, the probability that
the court will view the plaintiff's case more favorably than the plaintiff does, which is therefore
also the probability that a case with x= would succeed.
As in the case of prediction with certainty, this rule might discourage aplaintiff from
bringing a meritorious suit if the plaintiff's litigation costs are sufficiently large relative to the
amount at stake. The possibility that even a meritorious suit can lose, however,aggravates this
problem. Specifically, if O < C/B, then too little litigation results. In thesecases, either
C￿D or C>g, and the plaintiff will be discouraged from bringing some meritorious suits
because C would be too large relative to D.
Once we allow for prediction with uncertainty, moreover, it is no longer true that this
rule would discourage all frivolous suits. The plaintiff mightbring a frivolous suit if the
plaintiff's litigation costs are sufficiently small relative to the amount at stake, becauseeven a
frivolous suit migbt prevail. Specifically, if O> C/I),then too much litigation results. In
these cases, s< and the plaintiff would bring some frivolous suits, becausethe likelihood of
favorable judgments in these cases would be sufficiently high.9
2.The British Rule
Whereas the British rule ensures optimal incentives to sue under conditions of certainty,
it no longer does so under conditions of uncertainty. By the same reasoning we applied to the
American rule, we can show that under the British rule and conditions of uncertainty, the
plaintiff will sue if and only if x is greater than some C, which is defined by:
l-F(-s') =(C+C,J/(D+C+C4),
or equivalently:
C= - F4[l-(C+Cd)I(D+C,+Cd)]. (4)
Thus,this rule will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only if O, =
(C+C1JI(D+C,+C4). Again,once we allow for prediction with uncertainty, this rule no longer
ensures that all meritorious suits are encouraged and that all frivolous suits are discouraged.
This rule might discourage a plaintiff from bringing a meritorious suit if the parties'S
litigation costs are sufficiently large relative to the amount at stake, because even a meritorious
suit might lose. Specifically, if<(CP+Cd)/(D+c+Ca,then too little litigation results.
In these cases, s< X, and the plaintiff will be discouraged from bringing some meritorious suits
because the costs that it would bear in the event that the suit loses, CP+Cd, will be sufficiently
largerelativeto the gain in the event the suit wins, D.
Furthermore, this rule might encourage a plaintiff to bring a frivolous suit if the
plaintiff's litigation costs are sufficiently small, because even a frivolous suit might prevail.
Specifically, if >(CP+Cd)I(D+CP+Cà, thentoo much litigation results. In these cases,
s Cgand the plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits, because the likelthood of favorable
judgments in these cases would be sufficiently high.
Note that once we allow for prediction with uncertainty, it is no longer clear whether the
British rule or the American rule offers the plaintiff the greater incentive to sue. That is.
between the British rule and the American rule, it is ambiguous which rule implies the lower
threshold s. Comparing (3) and (4), we find that the incentive is greater under the British rule




For example, in the case in which the litigation costs of the two parties are equal, CJ, =
inequality(5)becomesC,+Cd > I). This rule of thumb suggests that when the litigation costs
of the parties are similar, the British rule offers the plaintiff greater incentives to sue than the
American rule if the total litigation costs exceed the amount at stake, but smaller incentives if
the amount at stake exceeds total litigation costs.
3. The Pro-Defendant Rule
By similar reasoning, we can show that under the pro-defendant rule, if C ￿D,then the
plaintiff would never sue. If <1) instead, however, then the plaintiff will sue if and only if
x is greater than some C, which is defined by:
1-F(-C) (C+C,J/(D+Ca,
or equivalently:
C =- F'(l - (C+CaI(D+CJ]. (6)
Thus,this nile will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only if O=
(Cp+Cd)/(D+C.J.
Again,as in the case of prediction with certainty, this rule might discourage a plaintiff
from bringing a meritorious suit if its litigation costs are sufficiently large. The possibility that
even a meritorious suit can lose, however, aggravates this problem. Specifically, if OC
(C+CaI(D+Ca, thentoo little litigation results. In these cases, either C ￿Dor C> t, and
plaintiffs will be discouraged from bringing some meritorious suits because the litigation costs
that the plaintiff would expect to bear would be too large.
Once we allow for prediction with uncertainty, however, it is no longer true that this rule
would discourage all frivolous suits. The plaintiff might bring a frivolous suit because even a
frivolous suit might prevail. Specifically, if>(C+Ca/(D+Ca,then too much litigation
results. In these cases, Ccxandthe plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits, because the
likelihood of favorable judgments in these cases would be sufficiently high.
If C<D, then the pro-defendant nile offers the plaintiff less incentive to sue than either
the American rule or the British rule: we can see from (6)thatthe pro-defendant rule implies11
a thresholdC that is strictly largerthan those undertheAmerican and British rules.' In cases
inwhich thereare excessiveincentives to sueundertheAmerican rule and underthe British
nile, a switch to the pro-defendant rule would reduce this incentive. As we have seen, however,
this correction would be crude: the reduction in the plaintiff's incentives would be less than
optimal in some cases and excessive in other cases.
4. The Pro-Plaintiff Rule
By similar reasoning, we can show that under the pro-plaintiff rule, the plaintiff will sue
if and only if x, is greater than some C, which is defined by:
l-F(X-s') =C,1(D+C),
or equivalently:
C= K - F[l-C/(D+C,)1. (7)
Thus, this rule will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only if O =C/(D+C).
Once we allow for prediction with uncertainty. thit rule no longer ensures that all meritorious
suits are encouraged and that all frivolous suits are discouraged.
This rule might discourage a plaintiff from bringing a meritorious suit if the plaintiffs
litigation costs are sufficiently large relative to the amount at stake, because even a meritorious
suit might lose. Specifically, ifCC,I(D+C),then too little litigation results. In these
cases, sfl, and the plaintiff will be discouraged from bringing some meritorious suits because
C, would be too large relative to D.
Furthermore, this rule might encourage a plaintiff to bring a frivolous suit if the
plaintiffs litigation costs are sufficiently small, because even a frivolous suit might prevail.
Specifically, if>CJ(D+C),then too much litigation results.. In these cases, s C K and the
plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits, because the likelihood of favorable judgments in these
cases would be sufficiently high.
The incentive to sue is the greatest under the pro-plaintiff rule insofar as (7) implies that
the threshold C is the lowest under this rule. That is, the pro-plaintiff rule implies a threshold
Cthatis strictly smaller than that under any of the other classic fee-shifting rules. In cases in
4IfC￿D instead, then the incentive to sue would be equally small under the American rule
and under the pro-defendant nile: in this case the plaintiff would never sue under either rule.12
which there is too little incentive to sue under the American rule and the British rule, a switch
to the pro-plaintiff nile would increase this incentive. Again, such a correction would be crude:
the reduction in the plaintiff's incentives would be less than optimal in some cases and excessive
in other cases.
Thus, none of the four classic fee-shifting rules can ensure a threshold such that C =
forall possible combinations of I), O,C,and Cd. Under each of these rules, plaintiffs will
bring some frivolous suits and fail to bring some meritorious suits. If the courts are restricted
to rules that simply wru on the identity of the winning party, they cannot ensure that plaintiffs
have the optimal incentives.
IV. THE OPTIMAL ONE-SIDED FEE-SHIFTING RULE
Until now we have examined rules under which, if there is fee-shifting at all, it can only
depend on the identity of the winner, that is, on whether ;> L In this section we drop this
constraint on the structure of the fee-shifting rules. We allow the courts to take into account the
margin of victory, that is, we allow the fee-shifting nile to be based on the difference between
; and X. As we will see, it is possible in many cases to design a rule that performs better than
any of the classic fee-shifting rules. Fee-shifting based on the margin of victory gives courts
an additional instrument with which to fme-mne the plaintiffs incentives to bring suit.
Let ybethe threshold for ; beyond which the court will require the defendant to
reimburse the plaintiff's litigation costs. That is, if x > 9,thenthe court shifts fees in favor
of the plaintiff. Let Sd be the threshold for ; below which the court will require the plaintiff
to reimburse the defendant's litigation costs. Specifically, if; Y.thenthe court shifts fees
in favor of the defendant.
In this section, we will limit ourselves to rules under which, for a given D, F(s), C, and
Cd, there may be fee-shifting only in favor of one side, throughout the domain of;. That is,
either5 =ory4=-. •Wewill consider how to design the best one-sided fee-shifting rule.
As we will see in the next section, where we wilt consider two-sided fee-shifting, limiting
ourselves to one-sided fee-shifting is not all that costly: the best two-sided rules do not perform
any better than the best one-sided rule.
As we will show, to design the best one-sided fee-shifting rule, it is helpful to distinguish13
between situations in which the American rule provides inadequate incentives to sue and those
in which it provides excessive incentives to sue. If O CC/fl,then this rule leads to too little
litigation: s> and plaintiffs do not sue often enough. If C/I) CO,then this rule leads to
too much litigation: C<x and plaintiffs sue too often. The first set of cases call for pro-
plaintiff fee-shifting, whereas the second set of cases call for pro-defendant fee-shifting.
A. Insufficient Incentive to Liti2ate Under the American Rule
If O CC/I),then the American rule leads to insufficient incentives to bring suit. Under
these circumstances, the American rule discourages all frivolous suits but also discourages some
meritorious suits. In this case, pro-plaintiff fee-shifting can improve the plaintiffs incentives
to sue:
Pronosition 1: If 0, CC/fl,then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule would specify that
the defendant pays the plaintiff's litigation costs if ;>5,where:
= +F4[1-(Cp9pD)ICJ. (8)
Thisnile would provide optimal results:it would both discourage all frivolous suits and
encourage all meritorious suits.
Proof: Under the proposed nile, the plaintiff would sue if and oniy if:
+Pr(xC>YPIxP)CP+ Pr(x>iIx)D >0.
Thus, the plaintiff would sue if and only if x,>s', where C is defined by:
-C, +E1-F(Y-C)]C,+ [1-F(-sD}D =0. (9)
Thus, to ensure that s'=L we must set j?, such that:
-C, +[1-P(y,-k)]C+ O,D =0. (10)
Note that the left-hand side of (10) is monotonically decreasing in 9,aslong as 0 CF(3,-i)C
1. If we let 9approach,thenF(9,4) goes to 1, so that the left-hand side of (10) must be
negative, and plaintiffs would not sue often enough. If we let 9,,approach-, thenF(,9,,-) goes
to 0, so that the left-hand side of (10) must become positive, so that plaintiffs would sue too
often. Thus, there exists a 9, that solves (10). Specifically, solving (10) for 9yieldsthe
expression for 9,givenin (8). S
Remark 1: Under the American rule, a plaintiff with x, equal to will expect to win O,D14
from going to thai at a costofC,,.If C, > OD, then the plaintiff's suit has negative expected
value not only for x=; but also for some x, slightly greater than X. If the plaintiff's litigation
costs can be shifted to the defendant with probability close to 1, whichwe canaccomplish with
a sufficiently small 5?,thenthe plaintiff can obtain positive expected value from bringing the
same cases. Because we can vary 5) continuously, we can fmd an intermediate value for 5
suchthatthe expected value of bringing suit will be exactly 0 for the case in which x,,=g.
Remark 2:LetP(9,,) represent the probability of reimbursement for the plaintiff given
thatx,,=t, so that P(9,,) is a decreasingfunctionof 5),,. Specifically, P(9,,) =l-F(9-X).The
solution for the optimal 5),, ensures that for x,=X, the expected costs of litigation, C -
willexactly equal the expected benefits, Ol). Thus, P(3,,) =1-O,,DIC,,, andif O=then
P(9,,) =1-DI2C,.
Remark3: Note that the plaintiff's expected payoff from bringing the marginal suit, the
left-hand side of (10). is strictly increasing in 9,, and D, but does not depend on Cd.
Furthermore, as long as 0 CF(S-X)< 1, this payoff will strictly decrease in 9,, and C,,.'
Thus, as long as the fee-shifting rule sets 5),, to optimize the plaintifrs incentives to bring suit
such that R-e1 C 9 C+e2,the optimal 5),, will strictly increase in 9, and D but strictly
decrease in Cr
That is, ceteris paribas, the optimal policy becomes more pro-defendant if eitheror
D increases, but more pro-plaintiff if C increases. If the award that the plaintiffexpects to
recover increases, then the optimal rule --tooffset the increased incentive to bring suit --must
decrease the probability that the defendant would have to bear the plaintiff's litigation costs, If
on the other hand, these litigation costs increase, then the optimal rule --tooffset the reduced
incentive to bring suit --mustdecrease the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear them.
Remark 4: In one case, the classic pro-plaintiff rule, which imposes the constraint
turns out to be the best one-sided rule. As we saw in Section 111.8, the classic pro-plaintiff rule
is optimal if and only if 0, =C,,I(D-l-C,,).In this section, we see that if C,,/(D+C,,) C
0,,<
'Aslong as there is some positive probability of x￿9,, when x,=, so that the court might
leave the burden of C,, on the plaintiff in the marginal suit, then the plaintiff'sexpected payoff
will be strictly decreasing in C,,.15
CJ,/D. then the best rule setshigher than R. In these cases, the classic pro-plaintiff rule leads
to too much litigation. In order to trigger pro-plaintiff fee-shifting under the best rule, the
plaintiff must not only win its case but also win by a sufficiently wide margin. If O'C
C/(D+C)instead, then the best rule sets ylowerthan L In these cases, the classic pro-
plaintiff rule leads to too little litigation, and is necessary to increase the plaintiff's
incentives. The best fee-shifting rule in these cases is even more pro-plaintiff than the classic
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule: in some of these cases the proposed rule shifts the plaintiff's fees
to the defendant even though the plaintiff loses. The plaintiff wins reimbursement not only when
it wins its case, but also when it loses its case by a sufficiently small margin.
RemarkS: Suppose we impose the constraint SP￿X,sothat the defendant would pay the
plaintiffs litigation costs only if the plaintiff prevails. The fee-shifting rule can be no more pro-
plaintiff than the classic pro-plaintiff nile. The rule in Proposition 1. however, can offer optimal
incentives to the plaintiff consistent with this constraint if and only if C/(C+D) If
instead:
CI(C+D) >op. (11)
then the constraint will be costly. The best nile consistent with the constraint would be the
classic pro-plaintiff rule, under which a plaintiff would sue if and only if x,>s', where s' is
defined by equation (7). If condition (11) holds, then equation (7) implies that s'>i: plaintiffs
that are not sufficiently confident of victory will not bring some meritorious suits because the
risk of losing and paying their own litigation costs will discourage them from bringing suit.
B. Excessive Incentive to Liti2ate Under the American Rule
If CID < O,thenthe American rule leads to excessive litigation. The American nile
encourages all meritorious suits but also encourages some frivolous suits. In this case, pro-
defendant fee-shifting can improve the plaintiffs incentives to sue:
Proposition 2: If C.,iD CO,then the best one-sided fee-shifting nile would provide for
pro-defendant fee-shifting. Specifically:
(a) If O, C(C+C4)ID, thenthe best one-sided fee-shifting nile would specify that the
plaintiff pays the defendant's litigation costs if ;￿yd, where:16
=& + F4[I-
(Cp+Cd-8,,D)/CdJ. (12)
Inthese cases, this rulewould createtheoptimalincentives for the plaintiff to bring suit.
(b) If O ￿ (c+cam,thenthebestone-sidedfee-shiftingrule wouldspecifythatthe
plaintiff pays the defendant's litigation costs if &￿Pd. where Pdi+e2. This rule would fall
short of producing optimal results only insofar as it will fail to discourage all frivolous suits.
Proof: Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff would sue if and only if:
+PT(x>ydlxP)Cd+Pr(;>Xlx)D > 0.
Thus,the plaintiff will sue if and only if x,>C, where C is defmed by:
+ [l-F(frC)]Cd + [1-F(X-s')]D =0. (13)
Thus, to ensure that s!, we must set Pdsuchthat:
+[l-F(Yd-X)]Cd+OD = 0. (14)
Notethat the left-hand side of (14) is monotonically decreasing in 9 as long as 0 CF(9d-) C
1.If we let Pdapproach-,thenF(9-)goesto 0, so that the left-hand side of (14) must be
positive, and plaintiffs would sue too often. If we let Pdapproach,thenF(fri) goes to I
In this case, the left-hand side of (14) becomes non-positive if and only if the following
inequality also holds:
OI) ￿Cp+Cd. (15)
Thus, there exists a Pd that solves (14) if and only if (15) holds; otherwise, there would always
be too much litigation. Assuming such a 9 exists, solving (14) for Pd yields the expression for
Pd given in (12).
Remark 1: Note that if litigation costs are sufficiently small relative to the amount at
stake, so that (15) fails to hold, then no fee-shifting rule can provide optimal incentives for the
plaintiff. In this case, even in the marginal case (in which x.=i), the plaintiff's expected payoff
from trial would exceed the litigation costs of ffi parties. Even if the plaintiffwere certain
that it would have to pay the fees of both parties, these costs would not deter the plaintiff from
bringing such a suit. In such cases, fee-shifting is an inadequate sanction to deter all frivolous
suits.
Remark 2: If condition (15) does not hold, then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule
would ensure that the plaintiff with the marginal case (or any worse case) would always bear the
defendant's litigation costs. To guarantee pro-defendant fee-shifting in all cases in which17
the coun must set Yd at least as high as X+e2. This rule would be the best one-sided fee-shifting
rule in that it maximizes the achievement of each objective: this rule would encourage all
meritorious suits and discourage as many frivolous suits as possible.
Remark 3: Note that the plaintiff's expected payoff from bringing the marginal suit, the
left-hand side of (14), is strictly increasing in OandP. but strictly decreasing in Ci,.
Furthermore, as long as 0 CF(94-t)C 1, this payoff will strictly decrease in YandCd.6
Thus,as long as the fee-shifting rule sets Yd to optimize the plaintiff's incentives to bring suit
such that £-e1 C9 C R+e2,the optimal 9willstrictly increase in 6 and D but strictly
decrease in; and Cd.
That is, ceteris paribus, the optimal policy becomes more pro-defendant if either Oor
D increases, but more pro-plaintiff if C, or Cd increases. If the award that the plaintiff expects
to recover increases, then the optimal rule —tooffset the increased incentive to bring suit --
mustincrease the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear the defendant's litigation costs.
If on the other hand, either the plaintiffs or the defendant's litigation costs increase, then the
optimal nile —tooffset the reduced incentive to bring suit --mustdecrease the probability that
the plaintiff would have to bear the defendant's litigation costs.
Remark 4: In one case, the classic pro-defendant rule, which imposes the constraint
94=x, turns out to be the best one-sided rule. As we saw in Section III.B, the classic pro-
defendant rule is optimal if and only if O= (C+CJ/(D+C4).In this section, we see that if
C,/D C OC (CP+Cd)I(D+Cà, thenthe best rule sets 9lowerthan K. In these cases, the
classic pro-defendant rule leads to too little litigation. In order to trigger pro-defendant fee-
shifting under the best nile, the defendant must not only win its case but also win by a
sufficiently wide margin. If (C+CjI(D+CaC O instead,then the best rule sets 94 higher
than K. In these cases, the classic pro-defendant rule leads to too much litigation, and Pd>gis
necessary to reduce the plaintiff's incentives. The best fee-shifting rule in these cases is even
more pro-defendant than the classic pro-defendant fee-shifting rule: in some of these cases the
'As long as there is some positive probability that ; 9whenx,K, so that the court might
place the burden of Cd on the plaintiff in the marginal suit, then the plaintiffs expected payoff
will be strictly decreasing in Cd.18
proposed rule shifts the defendant's fees to the plaintiff even though the defendant loses. The
defendant wins reimbursement not only when it wins its case, but also when it loses its case by
a sufficiently small margin.
Remark 5: Suppose we impose the constraint ,I￿L,sothat the plaintiff would pay the
defendant's litigation costs only if the defendant prevails. The fee-shifting rule can be no more
pro-defendant than the classic pro-defendant nile. The rule in Proposition 2, however, can offer
optimal incentives to the plaintiff consistent with this constraint if and only if C/i) CO,￿
(;+c)/(D+c,). Ifinstead:
(C+CaI(D+CaC O, (16)
thenthe constraint 9,SZ will be costly. The best nile consistent with the constraint would be
the classic pro-defendant rule, under which a plaintiff would sue if and only if x> C, where s
is defined by equation (6). If condition (16) holds, then equation (6) implies that C CL:
plaintiffsthat are not sufficiently convinced of defeat will bring some frivolous suits because the
possibility of winning and thereby avoiding fee-shifting will encourage them to bring suit.
C. Examole with a Uniform Distribution
A simple example provides a useful illustration of our results. Suppose for simplicity
that e is unifonnly distributed in the interval (-e, e), for some e>O. In this special case,
F(s) = tIe), (17)
and O = Solving (17) for the inverse function, we find:
F'(p) =(2p-1)e (18)
for p in the interval (0, 1). Using this particular inverse function in (8) and (12), we can derive
the optimal fee-shifting rules.
Proposition 2(a) implies that if C/I) C C(CP+Cd)ID, thenthe optimal rule specifies
that the plaintiff pays the defendant's litigation costs if ;￿yd,where:
Pd= X+ (D-2CP-Cd)eICd. (19)
This rule operates only against losing plaintiffs (that is, Yd￿X)ifand only if D ￿ 2CP+Cd.
Note that Pd is increasing in D but decreasing in C and Cd.Proposition2(b) implies that if
(CP+CàIDCinstead, then Yd￿+e. Finally, Proposition 1 implies that ifCCJD
instead, then the optimal rule would specify that the defendant pays the plaintiff's litigation costs19
if x<9, where:
=+ (D-CjefC. (20)
Thisrule operates only againstlosing defendants(thatis, y￿X)if and only if Notethat
5',is increasing inD but decreasingin C.
Note also this example reveals another comparative statics result: the effect of greater
uncertainty over the trial outcome is ambiguous. If the thresholds are set so as to create the
optimal incentives for the plaintiff to bring suit, then an increase inc could cause each threshold,
Yd in (19) and y,in(20). to either rise or fall, depending upon whether that threshold was
greater or less than g, Each threshold would have to adjust along with e so as to maintain both
the same probability of pro-defendant fee-shifting and the same probability of pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting in the marginal case.
V. THE FAMILY OF OPTIMAL FEE-SHIFTING RULES
In this section, we examine the possibility of fee-shifting rules under which, even for a
given D, Ffr), C,,, and Cd, the court may require either side to reimburse the other for its
litigation costs. l'hat is, we do not require either y or Yd =- tohold; instead, we can
allow both 5k,, and 5k to be finite for the same set of cases. We will consider how to design the
best two-sided fee-shifting rule. We analyze the best two-sided rule to see if it perfonns any
better than the best one-sided rule, and as we will see, it does not. We also study two-sided fee-
shifting rules because Rule 11 is an example of such a rule. Our analysis of how best to design
such a rule will shed light on the use of fee-shifting under Rule 11.
it will be helpful in this analysis to distinguish between the case in which 6,, C
(c,,+Ca/Dand the case in which ￿ (CP+Cd)/D. In the first case, fee-shifting can produce
the optimal incentives for plaintiffs to bring suit. In the second case, we will see that it cannot.
A. The Case in Which Fee-Shiftine Can Produce ODtimal Results
Let us look first at the case in which condition (15) holds: O ￿ (CP+Cd)/D.Inthis
case, if the plaintiff must always bear the litigation costs of both sides, then all frivolous suits
would be discouraged. The probability of error in favor of the plaintiff would not be sufficient
to induce the plaintiff to bear these costs. Thus, in this case one could conceive of a fee-shifting20
nile that would deter all frivolous suits. In fact, we find that there exists a whole family of two-
sided fee-shifting rules that can ensure that the plaintiff brings suit if and only if the case is
sufficiently suong:
Pronosition 3: If 0,, ￿(C+CaID,then there exist a family of two-sided fee-shifting
rules that would create the optimal incentives for the plaintiff to bring suit. Each such rule
would speci' that the defendant pays the plaintiff's expenses if ;> and that the plaintiffpays
the defendant's expenses if ;￿y,where:
+ (1-F(5-R)]C -F(,fri)Cd + 0P = 0. (21)
All of these rules would discourage all frivolous suits and encourage all meritorious suits.
Proof: Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff would sue if and only if:
+ Pr(x>y,,Ix,,)C -Pr(x￿YlIIxJ)Cd+ Pr(;fljx,,)D >0.
Thus, the plaintiff will sue if and only if x,,>C, where C is defined by:
-C,, +[1-F(9-s')JC,-F(frs)Cd+(1-F(R-C)]D=0. (22)
Thus, to ensure that C=, we must setandsuch that (21) holds. Note that the left-hand
side of (21) is inonotonically decreasing in Pd as long as 0 <F($'d-X)C 1 and in 9,, as long as
0 CF(5'5)C1.
If we let both Pd and 9 approach ,thenboth F(Sd-i) and F(3-) go to I, so that the
left-hand side of (21) must become non-positive, if and only if (15) holds. If we let bothPd and
9 approach -,thenboth F(Pd-X) and F(3-I) go toO. In this case, the left-hand side of (21)
must become positive, and plaintiffs would sue too often. Thus, there exists a pair (34,Y) that
solves (21) if (15) holds, If (15) does not hold, then there would always be too muchlitigation.
If such a solution exists, then there exists a whole family of solutions(Pd, P,). We can
solve (21) for either Pd or y.Thesolution for Pd may be expressed as a monotonically
decreasing function of 9,:
Yd(Yp)= * + F'{l-IC,+C - 0,1) - [1-F(3),-)]Cp]/C}. (23)
Similarly, the solution for 9,, may be expressed as a monotonically decreasing function of Po:
Y,(Sd)= +F'{l-[C,+Cd - 0P - Il-F(Yd-R)]Cd]/C,}. (24)
Thus, as long as both 0 CF(Yd-i)<1and 0 CF(fr)C1,increases in either 9 or 9, would
substitutefor increases in the other. S21
Remark 1: As longascondition (15) holds, there is a one-sided fee-shifting rule that
wouldproduceoptima!incentivesfor plaintiffs tobring suit.The best two-sidedfee-shifting rule
can producenobetter results, and as Proposition 3 shows, it produces no worse results.Wecan
designatwo-sided fee-shifting nile, indeeda wholefamily ofsuch rules,that wouldproduce
optimal results.
Remark 2: The optimal two-sided fee-shifting rule, like the optimal one-sided fee-shifting
rule, ensures that the expected value of going to trial is negative for x, Ci,zerofor the marginal
suit in which x,=X, and positive for x,>i. Without fee-shifting, the expected value of the
marginal suit would be -C +8D. Fee-shiftingadds the second and third terms to the
expression for the expected value of the marginal suit on the left-hand side of equation (21).
Equation (21) sets the expected value of the marginal suit, including the expected net gain (or
loss) from fee-shifting equal to 0.
Remark 3: We can vary yandYd in the optimal two-sided fee-shifting rule, but to
maintain optimal incentives, the sum of the second and third terms in equation (21) must remain
constant.Thus,as long as Yd >i-c1,so that pro-defendant fee-shifting ispossiblein the
marginal case,and< X+e2,sothat pro-plaintiff fee-shifting isalsopossibleinthe marginal
case,thenchanges in g,mustbe offset by an opposing change in Yd•Thatis, YéY)willbe
strictly decreasinginand yad) willbe strictly decreasinginYd'If we increasethe expected
costto theplaintiff from pro-defendantfee-shifting, thenwemustalsoincrease theexpected
benefitto theplaintifffrompro-plaintifffee-shifting.
Remark4: In designingatwo-sided fee-shiftingrule,therewould neverbe any reason
to set YdC i-c1or to set> i+e2.Considerarule with 5'C i-e1:there wouldbeno
reason not to increase Ydtoi-e1, because this change would only increase the expected costs of
frivolous suits; it would not affect meritorious suits. Similarly, if we are considering a rule with
>i+e2,then there is no reason not to lower j to i+e1, because this change would only
reduce the expected costs of meritorious suits; it would not affect frivolous suits. Neither of
these effects would be undesirable. Of course, if the other threshold is set optimally, then
making either of these changes would be unnecessary, because the rule would already discourage
all frivolous suits and encourage all meritorious suits. If the other threshold is not set optimally,
however, then these changes might be desirable.22
Remark 5:SupposeC > 8D,sothat there is an Sufficient incentive for the plaintiff
to bring suit under the American nile. In this case, the optimal one-sidedfee-shifting rule
providedfor pro-plaintiff fee-shifting and ruled out any pro-defendant fee-shifting. That is, it
set g= -, andin terms of equation (24), it set = Y(-).Notethat with the optimal two-
sided fee-shifting rule, as long as Pd>I-c,, so that there is some probability of pro-defendant
fec-shifting in the marginal case, we must increase the probability of pro-plaintiff fee-shifting
above what it would be under the optimal one-sided fee-shifting rule: that is, Yp(Yd) <Y&).
Note also that the sum of the second and third terms in equation (21) must equal C -
8D.Thus, if C > O, then this sum must be positive. If we suppose further that C=C4.
then1-F(5,-i) must exceed FQ'0-t).Therefore,under these assumptions, we must set the fee-
shifting thresholds such that the probability of pro-plaintiff fee-shifting must exceed the
probability of pro-defendant fee-shifting. For example, if Pd CI C g,under our rule, and the
distribution of e is symmetric about 0, then must be closer to I than 9 is.
Remark 6: Suppose C C6D,so that there is an excessive incentive for the plaintiff
to bring suit under the American nile. In this case, the optimal one-sided fee-shifting rule
provided for pro-defendant fee-shifting and ruled out any pro-plaintiff fee-shifting. That is, it
set9, =o, andin terms of equation (23), it set Yd =Pd(°').Note that with the optimal two-
sided fee-shifting rule, as long as 9,,C 1+;, sothat there is some probability of pro-plaintiff
fee-shifting in the marginal case, we must increase the probability of pro-defendant fee-shifting
above what it would be under the optimal one-sided fee-shifting rule: that is, PAY,,) >Y()
Note also that if C,, C9,1),then the sum of the second and third tenns in equation (21)
must be positive. If we suppose further that C,=C4, then F(34-i) must exceed 1-F(g-).
Therefore, under these assumptions, we must set the fee-shifting thresholds such that the
probability of pro-defendant fee-shifting must exceed the probability of pro-plaintiff fee-shifting.
For example, if Pd <I C 9,under our nile, and the distribution of e is symmetric about 0,
then 9mustbe closer to I than 9,is.
Remark 7: Note that the plaintiff's expected payoff from bringing the marginal suit, the
left-hand side of (21), is monotonically increasing in 0,, and D. Furthermore, as long as both23
0CF(3)C1and 0 CF(,9-i)C 1, this payoff will strictly decrease in5,, C,and C.7
Thus, if the fee-shifting rule sets both thesholds,andy,,tooptimize the plaintiff's incentives
to bring suit such that -e1 CY < £+e2and R-e1 CC 1+;,then each threshold--holding
the other constant —willincrease inand D but decrease in C4 and Ci,.
That is, ceteris raribus, the optimal policy becomes more pro-defendant if either Oor
D increases, but more pro-plaintiff if either Cd or C, increases. If the award that the plaintiff
expects to recover increases, then the optimal nile --tooffset the increased incentive to bring
suit —mustincrease the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear the parties' litigation
costs. If on the other hand, these litigation costs increase, then the optimal rule --tooffset the
reduced incentive to bring suit --mustdecrease the probability that the plaintiff would have to
bear them.
B. The Case in Which Fee-Shiftin2 Cannot Produce Ontimal Results
Consider the case in which condition (15) does not hold. If O> (C+C,J/D,then we
cannot discourage all frivolous suits, even if the plaintiff must always bear the litigation costs
of both sides. The probability of error in favor of the plaintiff would be sufficient to induce the
plaintiff to bear these costs in the marginal case: the plaintiff still anticipates positive expected
value from going to trial. Thus, in this case there is no fee-shifting rule that would deter all
frivolous suits.
Pronosition 4: If O>(CP4-CàID, then the best two-sided fee-shifting nile would
speci that the plaintiff pays the defendant's expenses if ;￿94 and that the defendant pays the
plaintiffs expenses if x>9, where Yd￿+e2 and ￿+e2.Under this rule, however, the
plaintiff would still have excessive incentives to bring suit.
Remark: If condition (15) does not hold, then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule would
7As long as the court threatens to impose both C4 and C on the plaintiff in the marginal suit,
its payoff will decrease in both parameters. In particular, if there is some positive probability
of &￿Yd when x,=X, then this payoff will be strictly decreasing in Cd.Similarly,if there is
some positive probability of x￿9, when x.,=X, then this payoff will be strictly decreasing in
also.24
set dtoensure that the plaintiff with the marginal case (or any worse case) would always bear
the defendant's litigation costs. The best two-sided fee-shifting rule does the sante, and also sets
y,,suchthat the defendant would never have to pay the plaintiffs litigation costs in a marginal
case (or in any worse case). This rule would be the best two-sided fee-shifting rule in that it
maximizes the achievement of each objective: this rule would encourage all meritorious suits
and discourage as many frivolous suits as possible. This nile would fall short of producing
optimal results insofar as it will fail to discourage all frivolous suits.
C. Fee-Shifting Subject to Constraints onand V4
Each of the classic fe-shifting rules is a special restricted case of the more general two-
sided fee-shifting rule, with (9,Y) constrainedto take on a particular pair of values: (-, o)
for the American rule; (i, )forthe British rule; (-,) forthe pro-plaintiff rule; and (L )
forthe pro-defendant rule. As we have seen, these constrained rules provide optimal incentives
only in very special circumstances. Similarly, constraints such as y4￿I or would also
restrict the circumstances under which the two-sided fee-shifting rule could provide optimal
incentives. These restrictions, however, prove to be less severe than those imposed by the
classic fee-shifting rules.
The constraint forexample, would imply that the fee-shifting rule can be no more
pro-plaintiff than the classic pro-plaintiff nile. Recall that even the classic pro-plaintiff rule
leads to too little litigation if and oniy if condition (11) holds. Thus, fee-shifting subject to the
constraint ￿ can provide optimal incentives if and only if the opposite condition holds, which
we can express as:
CpOd￿ O,D. (25)
Condition(25) states that in the marginal case, the plaintiffs expected gain from adjudication
must at least equal its expected liability for its litigation costs under the pro-plaintiff rule.
If the plaintiffs litigation costs are too great relative to the amount at stake, then (11)
rather than (25) holds. Then even under the pro-plaintiff rule, plaintiffs sue if and only if
x,>s, where C is defined by equation (7). As discussed in Section IV.A, condition (11)
implies s>, so that plaintiffs fail to bring some meritorious cases because they are sufficiently
close eases and the risk of losing is too great.25
Similarly, the constraint Yd￿Iwouldimply that the fee-shifting rule can be no more pro-
defendant than the classic pro-defendant rule. Recall that even the classic pro-defendant rule
leads to too muchlitigationif and only if condition (16) holds. Thus, fee-shining subject to the
constraint Yd￿g can provide optimal incentives if and only if the opposite condition holds, which
we can express as:
Ol) ￿ C, + (26)
Condition (26) states that in the marginal case, the plaintiff's expected gain from adjudication
cannot exceed its expected liability for litigation costs under the pro-defendant nile.
If litigation costs are too small relative to the amount at stake, then (16) rather than (26)
holds. Then as discussed in Section TV.B, condition (16) implies that the s defined by equation
(6) is greater than X. Thus, even under the pro-defendant nile, plaintiffs bring some frivolous
suits Where x.> s', because they are sufficiently close cases and the possibility of winning is
great enough to make the effort worthwhile.
D. Example with a Uniform Distribution
Suppose again for simplicity that c is uniformly distributed in the interval (-e. e). If (15)
holds, then we can use the Ffr) in (17) to derive the family of optimal rules for this example.
After rearranging terms, we find that Proposition 3 and (17) together imply that if
(C-f-Cà/D, then the optimal rule ensures that:
+ y4c, =(D-CP-Cae+ (;+C)i, (27)
where9,,and 9 both lie in the interval (R-e, +e).8 Solving (27) for 9, yields:
=K + [(D-C,,-Càe-
(Sd-K)CJIC,,, (28)
andsolving (27) for Ydyields:
=K + [(D-C,,-Càe-(9,,-X)C]/C4. (29)
Notethat this example reveals a comparative statics result analogous to that found under one-
sided fee shifting: the effect of an increase in the uncertainty of the trial outcome has an
ambiguous effect on the (9, 9,,) locus. An increase in çmaymove the locus to higher values
of 9,, and 9 or to lower values, depending on whether D is greater or less than C,,+C4.
tProposition 4 implies that if (C,,+CaID'Cinstead, then 9 K+e and 9, ￿ K+e.26
VI. IMPUCATIONS FOR RULE11
The authors of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 intended their rule to deter frivolous
suits, and accordingly one can interpret Rule 11 as an example of the type of fee-shifting rule
analyzed in this paper. Rule 11 requires an attorney (or a party not represented by an attorney)
to sign pleadings,motions, andother papers before filing them in court, thereby certifying that
to the best of that person's knowledge after a reasonable inquiry the paper has not been
presented for "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation," is "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," and is well grounded in
fact.' If a court determines that an attorney or party has violated this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon that person "an appropriate sanction,0
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the expenses
incurred as a result of the violation, including reasonable attorney's fees.
For example, if the plaintiff's case is so frivolous that the court rmds that the plaintiff's
attorney should have known the suit was without merit when filed, the rule allows the court to
shift the burden of the defendant's fees to the plaintiff. In enforcing Rule 11, courts have often
focused on the merits of claims and defenses in this way.'° Furthermore, in the overwhelming
majority of cases imposing sanctions under Rule 11, courts have punished the party filing the
"frivolous" paper by awarding costs and fees to the opposing party. See Nelken (1986,p.
1333). Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that "Rule 11 is a fee-
9Recent amendments to Rule 11 changed the language of the text, including a change from
"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law" to "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivplous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law." Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Forms (transmitted to Congress on Apr. 22, 1993) (emphasis added), reprinted in 61
U.S.L.W. 4365, 4269 (Apr. 27, 1993). These amendments take effect on December 1. 1993.
'°Schwarzer (1988), however, argues that courts should shift their scrutiny in Rule 11 cases
from the merits of the case to the adequacy of the attorney's prefiling inquiry. Because it is
difficult to predict whether a court will find a particular paper "frivolous," see Levinson (1986),
Schwarzer argues that such a shift from the merits to the attorney's conduct would promote more
predictable and less costly enforcement of Rule 11. As we have seen, however, auorneys do
not need to predict sanctions with certainty for Rule 11 to exert the desired deterrent effect.27
shifting statute." Hays v. Sony Corn,, 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988).
Critics of this interpretation of Rule 11. however, warn against routine use of expense-
shifting as a sanction. Burbank (1989), for example, argues that courts should exercise greater
discretion in selecting a sanction sufficient to deter in the particular circumstances of the cast
Similarly, the authors of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 concluded that the rule had "too rarely
been enforced through nownonetaxy sanctions" and "cost-shifting ...hastoo frequently been
selected as the sanction. "h'Consequently,the authors sought to emphasize deterrence as the
goal of Rule 11 and to discourage reliance on monetary sanctions, especially fee-shifting. Rule
1 1(c)(2) now states that the court may order payment of Nsome or all of the reasonable attorneys'
fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation" if such cost-shifting is
"warranted for effective deterrence? The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules conceded that
"cost-shifting may be needed for effective deterrence in some situations, but sought "to
emphasize that cost-shifting awards should be the exception, rather than the norm, for
sanctions.
Themodel in this paper, however, indicates that tailoring the deterrent effect of Rule 11
sanctions is more complicated given the existence of uncertainty over trial outcomes. If courts
cannot observe x, then they cannot know how likely the plaintiff thought its suit was to succeed
at trial. Given this uncertainty, a court cannot tailor the sanction in any particular case to that
level just sufficient to deter that particular plaintiff. The deterrent effect upon any particular
plaintiff is also a function of all the other sanctions that the plaintiff considered possible. That
'1Attachment B to letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
3-4 (May 1, 1992), reorinted in Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms
120-21 (transmitted to Congress on Apr. 22, 1993).
'2Attachment B to letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
4 (May 1, 1992), renrinted in Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms
121 (transmitted to Congress on Apr. 22, 1993). These amendments provoked a dissenting
statement by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas. Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Forms 104-07(transmittedto Congress on Apr. 22, 1993), reorinted in 61
U.S.L.W. 4392-93 (Apr. 27, 1993).28
is,this deterrent effect depends not only upon the sanction imposed in any particular case, as
the court views the case, but also upon what sanctions the court would impose if it viewed the
case differently —thatis, if it observed a different;.
Viewed in this light, fee-shifting can be more flexible and more useful "for effective
deterrencC than implied by the Advisory Committee. Our analysis suggests how courts can
control RuleIi'sdeterrent effect not only by varying the magnitude of the sanctions, but also
by varying the thresholds that will trigger the sanctions)3 That is, this paper suggests that
courts can tailor the deterrent effect to the particular circumstances of the case by choosing the
conditions under which sanctions would be imposed, not necessarily by adjusting the severity
of the sanctions."
Within our analytical framework, Rule ii is a two-sided fee-shifting rule, because it
allows for the possibility of fee-shifting in either direction in each case. Our analysis sheds light
on the question of how the thresholds for fee-shifting should be set. Given particular definitions
of frivolous and meritorious suits, we have shown how the optimal thresholds would depend on
the size of the litigation costs (CdandC) relative to the amount at stake (D) and on the
distribution of the error term Ce).
Given enough information on F(e), for example, there may be cases where fee-shifting
would obviously be appropriate. Whenever the plaintiff wins by such a large margin that there
'3Courts generally have the authority to determine both the magnitude of Rule 11 sanctions
and the circumstances that will trigger them. That is, Rule ii gives courts control over both
the policy instruments that we model in this paper and the instruments analyz.ed by Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1992; 1993), who examine the magnitude of awards and sanctions as control
variables.
"The Advisory Committee apparently believed that fee-shifting often exceeds what is
necessary for effective deterrence. The analysis in this paper indicates that while fee-shifting
may be more than sufficient to deter some frivolous suits, it need not ever lead to excessive
deterrence in the sense of discouraging meritorious suits.In fact, the most important
shortcoming of reliance on fee-shifting alone is that it would be insufficient for effective
deterrence of all frivolous suits. To the extent that courts with to limit fee-shifting to just that
amount sufficient to deter (reducing the plaintiffs expected value of bringing each frivolous suit
to exactly zero), they can seek to do so by choosing partial reimbursement of attorneys' fees.
as permitted by Rule 11. The extension of our model discussed in Section V11.C would also
include this flexibility.29
is no chancethatthe plaintiff has brought a frivolous suit but won through judicialerror,then
the defendant should pay the plaintiff's litigation costs. This fee-shifting policy might encourage
meritorious suits that would not otherwise be brought, and it would not encourage any frivolous
suits. Similarly,wheneverthe defendant wins by such a large margin that there is no chance
that the plaintiff has brought a meritorioussuitbut lost through judicial error,thenthe plaintiff
should pay the defendant's litigation costs. l'his fee-shifting policy might discourage such
frivolous suits, and it would not discourage any meritorious suits.
We have seen, however, that it may well be desirable to shift fees in a larger set of
cases. In particular, a court might inquire wbether there is, in the absence of such fee-shifting,
either insufficient or excessive incentives for the plaintiff to bring suit. To this end, the court
would need to determine the expected value for the plaintiff of going to thai with the marginal
case. This expected value depends on the plaintiffs litigation costs, the amount at stake, and
the likelihood of judicial error on the merits in either direction)' If this expected value is
negative, then the plaintiff has insufficient incentives to sue; if this expected value is positive,
then the plaintiff has excessive incentives to sue.
If there is an insufficient incentive to sue in the absence of fee-shifting, then the ideal fee-
shifting rule would offer the plaintiff a net expected gain in the marginal case. That is, the
thresholds should be set in such a way that the expected pro-plaintiff fee-shifting would exceed
the expected pro-defendant fee-shifting. If the plaintiffs and defendant's litigation costs are
similar, then the thresholds should imply that the likelihood of pro-plaintiff fee-shifting exceeds
the likelihood of pro-defendant fee-shifting. Thus, the thresholds should be set so as to favor
the plaintiff: if errors are distributed symmetrically about 0 and litigation costs are similar, then
"To set precisely the best thresholds for fee-shifting requires more information than courts
are likely to have in reality. Nevertheless, our analysis suggest at least some crude rules of
thumb. Although courts would not be able to implement perfectly the best fee-shifting rule, they
should be able to achieve roughly the desired effect on plaintiffs' incentives. They may shift
fees in some cases in which the best nile would not, and fail to shift fees in some cases in which
the best nile would call for it. Unless one type of departure from the best nile predominates,
however, the two types of error in fee-shifting decisions would tend to offset one another. Such
random errors --withoutsystematic bias —wouldhave little net effect on the plaintiffs expected
value from bringing suit.30
the threshold for pro-plaintiff fee-shifting should be closer to the standard for liability than the
threshold for pro-defendant fee-shifting is.
In constrast, if there is an excessive incentive to sue in the absence of fee-shifting, then
the ideal fee-shifting rule would impose a net expected cost on the plaintiff in the marginal case.
That is, the thresholds should be set in such a way that the expected pro-defendant fee-shifting
would exceed the expected pro-plaintiff fee-shifting. If the plaintiff's and defendant's litigation
costs are similar, then the thresholds should imply that the likelihood of pro-defendant fee-
shifting exceeds the likelihood of pro-plaintiff fee-shifting.t'
In any case, the comparative statics results in Section V.A offer some further guidance
for courts exercising the discretion that they enjoy under Rule 11. Courts should give Rule 11
an interpretation more generous to plaintiffs in cases in which the litigation costs are larger
relative to the amount at stake. As Section V.A indicates, this 'interpretation may mean that
courts use Rule II more sparingly against plaintiffs, or that they use it more aggressively against
defendants, or both. Conversely, if the amount at stake is larger relative to the litigation costs,
then courts should invoke Rule 11 more readily against plaintiffs and less frequently against
defendants.
As the examples in Sections IV.C and V.C indicate, an increase in the plaintifrs
uncertainty over the trial outcome has an ambiguous effect on the optimal fee-shifting rule: it
can militate in favor of either a more pro-plaintiff or a more pro-defendant rule. We have
assumed, however, that the plaintiff is risk neutral. Given a risk-averse plaintiff, an increase
in risk would magnify the deterrent effect of any given fee-shifting rule. This effect suggests
that courts should give Rule 11 a more pro-plaintiff interpretatibn in the face of greater legal
uncertainty or when dealing with particularly risk-averse plaintiffs. Thus, it may be appropriate
for courts to afford more favorable treatment under Rule 11 to plaintiffs that bring suit in
t6Thusthethresholds should be set so as to favor the defendant: if errors arc distributed
symmetrically about 0 and litigation costs are similar, then the threshold for pro-defendant fee-
shifting should be closer to the standard for liability than the threshold for pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting is.31
unsettled areas of the law or those with lower levels of wealth."
Our analysis, however, suggests two limitations on the ability of courts to create optimal
incentives through the use of Rule 11 as a two-sided fee-shifting device. One limitation flows
from the inherent limits on the usefulness of fee-shifting rules in reducing excessive incentives
to sue. If the amount at stake is sufficiently large relative to litigation costs, then condition (15)
fails: given the probability of judicial error, even tho prospect of always paying the litigation
costs of both sides would not discourage all frivolous suits.
In these cases, a court would have to impose additional penalties in order to discourage
these suits. For example,underRule 11 courts may impose fines or nonmonetary sanctions as
well as fees and costs)' Courts may want to use such sanctions in order to achieve adequate
deterrence. Our analysis shows that fee-shifting alone would prove inadequate as a sanction in
those cases in which the amount at stake is so large relative to the litigation costs that condition
(15) fails to hold: the expected gain from bringing the marginal case exceeds the litigation costs.
l'he same analysis suggests how in theory courts might increase its sanctions just enough to
reduce the expected value for the plaintiff of bringing the marginal suit down to zero)9
There is, however, another limitation, which the authors of Rule 11 have written into the
'7To put this suggestion in the language of Rule 11, in unsettled areas of the law, more
lawsuits will be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law? Furthermore, the Advisory Committee identified
"cases involving litigants with greatly disparate financial resources" as examples of cases "in
which cost-shifting may be needed for effective deterrence." Attachment B to letter from Sam
C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman,
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 4 (May 1, 1992), reprinted in
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms 121 (transmitted to Congress
on Apr. 22, 1993). The committee presumably intended to endorse cost-shifting in favor of the
party with fewer resources.
"As amended in 1993, Rule 11 explicitly authorizes "directives of a nonmonetary nature"
and "an order to pay a penalty into court," although these sanctions were also available under
Rule 11 prior to 1993. See Schwarzer (1985, pp. 201-04).
19Specifically, sufficiently large sanctions would replace the defendant's costs, Cd, in (14)
and (15) with some greater penalty such that (15) holds and a solution for Yd in (14) exists.
Then this sanction, if applied with the appropriate probability, would ensure that the plaintiff
would have neither too much nor too little incentive to bring suit.32
rule. Rule 11 reserves all sanctions for parties that lose by wide margins, so that fees cannot
be shifted in favor of a losing party. In terms of the model presented in this paper. Rule 11
restricts the thresholds, yandYd' so that ,Ci < Pd'Wehave seen, however, that these
constraints may excludefee-shiftingthat would improve litigation incentives. Given these
constraints, Rule 11fee-shiftingcould not ensurethatplaintiffs haveoptimalincentives, even
if litigation costs are large enough relative to the amount at stake toensurecondition (15)holds.
Fee-shifting under Rule 11canprovideoptimal incentivesifand only if theinequalitiesin (25)
and(26)bothholdstrictly,that is, if and only if:
CAd < 9pDCCI,+CdBd.
Thatis, in the marginal case, the plaintiff's expected gain from adjudication must fall between
its expected liability for litigation costs under the classic pro-plaintiff rule and its expected
liability under the classic pro-defendant rule. Nevertheless, Rule 11 can provide optimal
incentives to the plaintiff over a wider range of cases than either the American nile or the British
rule, which subject fee-shifting to still more severe resthctions.
As we have noted. Rule 11 also allows for sanctions other than the award of attorneys'
fees, and these other sanctions may supplement the use of fee-shifting. Courts may use these
sanctions when litigation costs are too small relative to the amount at stake for inequality (26)
to hold. In these cases, the prospect of Rule 11 fee-shifting (subject to the constraint Pd
would be insufficient to deter all frivolous lawsuits, and additional penalties would be
appropriate. That is, if the amount at stake is sufficiently large relative to litigation costs, so
that the plaintiff will have excessive incentives to bring suit even under the classic pro-defendant
rule, then the court would have to impose a larger sanction on a losing plaintiff than pro-
defendant fee-shifting. In such cases, one must supplement or replace Cd under such restricted
fee-shifting with some other sanctions for plaintiffs.20 A sufficiently large sanction could
reduce the expected value of the marginal suit to zero, so as to provide optimal incentives for
the plaintiff, even if courts can impose sanctions only against losing plaintiffs.
20As with condition (15), if (26) failed to hold, a court could substitute a greater sanction
for Cd in (26) such that the inequality in (26) would hold. Because (26) is a stronger condition
than (15), a greater sanction would be necessary to satisfy (26) than to satisfy (15).33
In other cases, the plaintiff's litigation costs are so great relative to the amount at stake
that condition (25) fails to hold, and too little litigation results even under the classic pro-plaintiff
rule. The authors of Rule 11, however, did not focus on this problem and do not explicitly
provide courts with any instrument to handle these cases. In these cases, our analysis suggests
that a court shouldsupplementpro-plaintiff fee-shifting by awarding a winning plaintiff an extra
amount. Under Rule 11, a court might characterize such an award as a sanction imposed on the
defendant for a frivolous defense against a meritorious claim by the plaintiff.
The authors of the most recent amendments to Rule 11, however, sought to discourage
such sanctions. The committee notes explain:
Since the pv.tppse of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the nile
provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court
as a penalty. However, under unusual circumstances, ...deterrencemay be ineffective
uniess the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary
payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those injured by
the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the court ...toaward attorney's fees to
another party. Any such award to another party, however, should not exceed the
expenses and attorneys' fees for the services directly and unavoidably caused by the
violation
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 committee notes, renrinted in Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Forms 184-85(transmittedto Congress on Apr. 22. 1993). Therefore, it would
appear that sanctions paid to the other party under Rule 11 cannot go beyond fee-shifting.
Although our analysis would suggest that such sanctions may be useful in inducing plaintiffs to
bring meritorious suits, the authors of Rule 11 were instead solely concerned with deterring
frivolous papers.
We have drawn these implications for Rule 11 from an analysis based on certain premises
regarding the definition of frivolous and meritorious suits. We will consider other possible
definitions in the next section, in which we consider how our analysis might be extended.
VII. EXTENSJONS
In this section. we present some extensions of the preceding model. First, we relax the
assumption that the plaintiff knows x with certainty. Second, we relax the assumption that the
social objective is for plaintiffs to sue if and only if they believe the defendant is liable. Third,34
we consider the implications of policies other than fee-shifting. Fourth, we consider the
possibility that the parties will settle out of court rather than go to thai.
A. Plaintiff Uncertainty Re2ardin2 x
An important element in the analysis is the presence of legal uncertainty: the plaintiff
may be uncertain about the outcome of a thai. One source of such uncertainty, and the one we
have used for concreteness in our model, is the possibility of an erroneous decision by the court:
even if the plaintiff can observe the "true merit" of its case, the court might not observe the
"true merit" accurately, and the plaintiff cannot completely predict the court's error. A second
possible source of uncertainty is the possibility of an erroneous evaluation by the plaintiff: the
plaintiff might be uncertain about the "true merit" of its own case.
Until now we have not considered this second possibility: we have assumed that x =x.
We can assume instead that not only the court but also the plaintiff observes x, the "true merit'
of the case, with error. Specifically, let x, =x+s,and ; =x+ç,with both ç and e as
random variables. In this case,; =x1,+e,as before, where now e =ç-e.The model yields
the same results as before, with the random variable enowreinterpreted to represent the
difference between the court's error and the plaintiff's error.
As this discussion suggests, in fact, it is not important for our results whether any "true"
value of x exists at all. Although we have assumed that there is a 'true" value for x, we can
also give our framework a interpretation under which there is no "true" x. Instead, there is only
what the court will determine x to be, ;,andthe plaintiff's expectation as to what the court's
determination will be. In this case, let xp denote the expected value attached by the plaintiff to
;.Theplaintiff knows only that; =x+e,where e is distributed according to F(t), and the
analysis proceeds as before.
B. Other SocialObjectives
I.Different Thresholds for Desirable Suits
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that x'. the threshold thatmust exceed for
a suit to be socially desirable, equals X. That is, we took the policy goal to be to induce the
plaintiff to sue if and only if it observes x, greater than L We can, however, allow for x" other35
than£.
Athreshold different from X is especially plausible once we consider plaintiffs that
observe x only with error. Suppose that x =x+e,whereis distributed symmetrically about
0. In this case, setting C=k implies that plaintiffs should sue if and only if they believe that
x >2 with a 50 percent probability. One can just as easily consider a policy that would require
plaintiffs to sue if and only if they have a greater confidence level than 50 percent or a lower
confidence level than 50 percent.
For example, courts may identify a class of suits that society would not want to
discourage even though the plaintiffs regard their claims as unlikely to succeed. There may be
some public good flowing from these suits, even if plaintiffs estimate that their likelihood of
success is substantially less than 50 percent. A suit may be unlikely to succeed, for example,
because it relies on innovative legal theories. Controversy over Rule 11 focuses on the risk that
sanctions will discourage the use of innovative legal theories. See, e.g., Nelken (1986); Note
(1987). Courts can respond to these concerns by allowing an attorney greater leeway in making
a losing argument when it is a novel "argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law," in the language of Rule ll.'Interms of our model, if a suit is likely to fall
short of success on this particular ground, courts may set x'CX to encourage such litigation.
l'hat is, to the extent that any other social objective militates in favor of plaintiffs bringing some
particular types of lawsuits, a more pro-plaintiff policy would be appropriate.
This extension requires only minor modifications in the preceding analysis. Again, we
would setor 9(orboth) so that so that the expected value for the plaintiff of going to trial
with the marginal suit is 0, but now we regard the case in which x=x' (rather than x=X) to
be the marginal suit. Thus, x" would replace 2 where appropriate? The plaintiff is still
indifferent about bringing the marginal suit, but we have changed the probability of success of
21Wilder (1986) argues that courts have in fact been sensitive to the chilling effect of
sanctions and have used Rule 11 cautiously.
For example, one would substitute x" for 2 in (8), (12), (19). (20), (23), (24), (28). and
(29). Note also that F(i-x") replaces F(0) in the definition of 6 and °d'andF(5,-x') replaces
and F(90-x") replaces F(Yd-k) in the preceding discussion.35
the marginal suit. Thus, such an extension wouldstillpreserve the general thrust of our results.
A lower f implies a lower expected value for the marginal suit in the absence of fee-
shifting. If we reduce ,C, then we are more likely to have an inadequate incentive to sue (and
less likely to have an excessive incentive to sue) in the absence of fee-shifting. Thus, a
reduction in f implies that the best fee-shifting rule is more pro-plaintiff: it is more likely to
put the burden of litigation costs on the defendant, with a loweror Yd(ora set of lower 9,
and Yd values)?
2. The Choice of the Social Objective
Thus fir, we have assumed that we are given a particular defmition of good and bad
suits, that is, a specific threshold f above which suits are sufficiently strong to be socially
desirable. Our analysis examined only how to induce the optimal litigation decisions, given this
criterion. The criteria for optimal litigation decisions, however, should ultimately be derived
in a comprehensive normative analysis rather than taken as given.
Deriving the optimal level of litigation requires a complex analysis that may produce
different conclusions in different contexts. Generally, a complete analysis would consider not
only the underlying social objectives to be served by the litigation but also the total
administrative costs of the legal system. For example, the substantive rights given to the
plaintiff may be designed to enhance efficiency by inducing the defendant to behave properly.
If litigation were costless, then the optimal level of litigation would simply provide optimal
deterrence: it would neither over-deter nor under-deter defendants. The analysis, however,
would also have to consider the effect of litigation costs.
First, the magnitude and the allocation of these costs would affect the defendant's
incentives cx ante. For example, fee-shifting rules affect not only the plaintiff's incentive to
bring a negligence suit, but also the cost to the defendant of such a lawsuit. Through both these
"Conversely, a higher f implies a more pro-defendant rule. A higher f implies a higher
expected value for the marginal suit in the absence of fee-shifting. If we raise x'. then we are
more likely to have an excessive incentive to sue (and less likely to have an inadequate incentive
to sue) in the absence of fee-shifting. Thus, an increase in f implies that the best fee-shifting
rule is less pro-plaintiff: it is more likely to put the burden of litigation costs on the plaintiff,
with a higher g, or Yd (or a set of higherand Yd values).37
effects, such rules affect a potential defendant's incentive to take care. See P'ng (1987); Hylton
(1990). Thus, the optimal fee-shifting rule would depend upon more than just the rule's effects
on the plaintiffs incentives to bring suit.
Second, the reduction of total litigation costs would presumably be another social
objective in designing an optimal rule. Sec Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1992; 1993). Ultimately,
one would determine the optimal incentives for plaintiffs to bring suit by weighing the social
costs of suboptimal primary behavior by defendants cx ante against the social costs of lawsuits
cx post, which include the expenditure of resources by both parties and by the court. The social
value of some litigation may be so trivial relative to its social costs that we would want to
discourage such lawsuits even if they are likely to succeed. On the other hand, as we have
already suggested, the social value of other cases may be so great relative to their social costs
that we would want to encourage them tven if they are unlikely to succeed. The goal of optimal
fee-shifting rules would be to align the plaintiffs private incentives to bring a suit with the net
social benefits of that suit. See Shavell (1982b).
Finally, fee-shifting itself may entail additional administrative costs. If fee-shifting
depends on the determination of x, panics may expend greater resources litigating the issue of
x.2' Furthermore, the issue of fee-shifting depends on the resolution of issues other than the
court's determination on the merits. For example, in our framework, a court must determine
F(s), Cd,andC,as well as the margin of victory, and in practice these issues might be costly
for the parties and the court to resolve. In fact, critics have often charged that Rule 11 has
generated too much costly "satellite litigation." See Higginbotham et al. (1991, p. 167).
If fee-shifting does not flow automatically from the courCs determination on the merits,
24Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar (1984) and Hause (1989) both present models in which the
probability that the plaintiff prevails at trial is a function of the litigation expenditures of both
parties. Each concludes that a switch from the American rule to the British rule would increase
the total expenditures on litigation. Not only do higher stakes increase the marginal value of
these expenditures, but the prospect of reimbursement also reduces the expected private cost of
one's own expenditures. One might expect a similar effect under fee-shifting rules that depend
on the margin of victory. In our model, however, we have assumed that litigation costs are
fixed exogenously and that the distribution of s is independent of these litigation costs. Further
research is necessary to address the implications of endogenous litigation costs for the analysis
in this paper.38
asin the classic fee-shifting rules, then a party seeking reimbursement must make the decision
whether to petition the court for it, and the cost of litigating the fee-shifting petition itself might
discourage potential petitioners. If the administration of fee-shifting rules is itself costly, then
this cost and its effects must also enter the analysis. See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1993).
Further research is necessary to address the many issues raised by these more complex social
objectives, which fall outside the scope of the prelminty analysis in this paper.
Similar problems arise when the underlying social policy is not the promotion of
efficiency. For example, substantive laws may give rights to plaintiffs in order to serve some
principle of fairness or of distributive justice. In these contexts, one would evaluate the extent
to which a given level of litigation transfers wealth from defendants to plaintiffs in those cases,
and only in those cases, in which the underlying principle requires such transfers. Presumably,
this analysis would also have to consider the effects of litigation costs. Thus, the optimal level
of litigation may well depend on many situation-specific factors, requiring separate analysis for
different circumstances.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that in many cases the conclusion would be such that
plaintiffs with sufficiently strong cases should sue whereas plaintiffs with sufficiently weak cases
should not. Whether our goals relate to economic efficiency and deterrence, or to fairness and
distributive justice, stronger cases would be more likely to contribute to our goals than weaker
cases. Therefore, we believe that our framework, which determines how to induce plaintiffs to
sue if and only if they believe their cases to be sufficiently strong, is of general interest.
C. Policy Instruments Other Than Fee-Shiftirm
Thus far, we have assumed that the court can impose only fee-shifting as a sanction. The
court simply sets the thresholds that will trigger fee-shifting. More generally, as already
suggested, one could also make the size of the sanction a policy variable. That is, one could
imagine rules under which the defendant pays the plaintiff S, if ;>yandplaintiff pays the
defendant Sd if ;￿yd.Evenmore generally, you could have the net transer S from defendant
to plaintiff be a non-decreasing function of;. In that case, the plaintiff's expected payoff from
litigation still increases monotonically in x7,. The basic approach of this paper still applies: the39
court can set the function S(xJsuchthat the plaintiff is just indifferent about bringing the
marginal suit, but willing to bring better suits and unwilling to bring worse suits.
Given that the absolute value of S(xJ can be raised over the level of reimbursement for
litigation costs, it should always be possible to induce optimal decisions, even if the court can
impose sanctions only on the losing party.' For example, in the case discussed in Section V.C
in which condition (25)failsto hold, we would have to supplement or replace fee-shifting
subject to the constraint £ with other policies in order to induce plaintiffs to bring suit in
all appropriate cases. Courts might provide for additional awards in some cases to induce
plaintiffs to bring meritorious suits that they would otherwise not bring because of high litigation
costs. If courts make the net transfer a function of;, rather than a fixed D plus a two-sided
fee-shifting rule (as we have assumed), then they have a more general policy instrument that can
be particularly useful when fee-shifting rules canot provide sufficient incentives for the plaintiff
to bring suit. Specifically, we can increase the expected value of the plaintiffs suit by shifting
the S(xJ function up.2'
If Rule 11 were to permit sanctions paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in excess of the
plaintiff's attorney's fees, then a court could use this authority to encourage plaintiffs to bring
suit. Although Rule 11 explicitly authorizes partial reimbursement of attorneys' fees, the Rule
11 committee notes suggest that transfers should not exceed these fees. There are also other
policy instruments, however, that can shift the S(XJ function. Suppose for example that a court
is more likely to award punitive damages in a tort case if it finds that the defendant was grossly
negligent. In this case, the expected damages anticipated by the plaintiff will depend on the
plaintiff's observed x.,,, because the amount awarded upon a finding a liability will be correlated
with the court's findings on x. By increasing the punitive damages or awarding them more
readily, courts could shift the S(x) function up. Or we could provide for treble damages in a
"To the extent that Rule 11 authorize such sanctions, they are at least subject to the
constraints that S(xJ￿O for ;)g and for ;￿R.
2'Similarly, if condition (26) fails to hold, then we would have to supplement or replace fee-
shifting subject to the constraint 5￿X with other policies in order to discourage plaintiffs from
bringing any frivolous suits. Specifically, we can decrease the expected value of the plaintiffs
suit by shifting the S(x,) function down.40
particularcategoryof cases to increase the amount recovered, so that condition (25)canhold.:7
1). Out-of-Court Settlements
The preceding model excludes the possibility of out-of-court settlements. In reality,
parties usually settle out of court before going to trial. A question left open for future research
is the incorporation of settlement into the model. We have assumed that the plaintiff sues only
if the expected value of going to trial is positive. If we introduce the option of settlement,
plaintiffs will still bring every suit with positive expected value, but it is no longer the case that
they will never bring a suit with negative expected value. Even if litigating to judgment is not
worthwhile, plaintiffs may bring such suits solely to extact a settlement offer. See Bebchuk
(1988, 1991); Rosenberg and Shavell (1985). Therefore, the possibility of settlements raises the
incentives for plaintiffs to sue, compared with a model that excludes settlements.
An analysis of fee-shifting rules and settlements would also have to consider the effect
of fee-shifting rules on settlements. That is, the analysis would not only take into account how
settlements raise the incentives for plaintiffs to sue, but also how fee-shifting rules affect the
bargaining power of the parties in settlement negotiations. For example, fee-shifting rules affect
the parties' expected payoffs from adjudication, and thereby influence how the parties divide the
surplus gained by avoiding the litigation costs imposed by a failure to settle insofar as that
failure leads to trial and judgment. Because fee-shifting rules can set the "threat point" of the
settlement bargaining and thereby influence the settlement amount, they can stilt improve the
plaintiff's incentives to bring suit by adjusting that threat point to fit the circumstances of the
case?
"Alternatively, in a particular category of cases we could provide for subsidies or less costly
procedures to reduce the plaintiff's C, or reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof to increase
to ensure that condition (25)held.Similarly, in other cases in which condition (26) fails to
hold, one could raise the plaintiff's burden of proof, in order to reduce O so that condition (26)
could hold, and thereby induce plaintiffs to bring suit only in appropriate cases.
2ro design optimal fee-shifting rules, however, we would also have to consider their effect
on the likelihood of settlement and the complex considerations described in Section VII.B.2.41
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